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Key Messages for Policy-Makers 
entral banks in the developed world are being misled into fighting the perceived dangers 
of a ‘deflationary spiral’ because they are looking at only one indicator: consumer prices. 
While consumer prices are flat, broader price indices do not show any sign of impending 
deflation: the GDP deflator is increasing in the US, Japan and the euro area by about 1.2-1.5%. The 
real economy is not sending deflationary signals either: Unemployment is at record lows in the 
US and Japan, and is declining in the euro area while GDP growth is at, or above potential. Thus, 
the overall macroeconomic situation does not give any indication of an imminent deflationary 
spiral. 
In today’s high-debt environment, central banks should be looking at the GDP deflator and the 
growth of nominal GDP, instead of CPI inflation. Nominal GDP growth, as forecasted by the 
major official institutions, remains robust and is in excess of nominal interest rates. 
If the ECB were to set the interest rate according to the standard rules of thumb for monetary 
policy, which take into account both the real economy and price developments of broader price 
indicators, it would start normalising its policy now, instead of pondering over additional 
measures to fight a deflation, which does not exist. Economic conditions are slowly normalising; 
so should monetary policy.  
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he latest data on inflation (and inflation 
expectations) in the euro area (EA) and 
Japan have reignited concerns about a 
possible deflationary spiral. This has led to a 
large debate about what additional monetary 
policy tools could, and should, be used to prevent 
this from happening. Even “helicopter money”, 
i.e. the overt monetary financing of government 
deficits,1 is now being mentioned. 
This concern about low inflation, however, is 
difficult to square with the data on the real 
economy. Growth remains steadily positive2 in 
advanced economies and employment is nearing 
historical heights even in the euro area (see 
Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Employment rates in the US, Japan and the 
euro area (1999-2015 and projections 2016-17) 
 
Data source: Ameco. 
This raises the question what monetary policy 
should do when inflation and the real economy 
send different signals. A simple and practical 
solution for this quandary is provided by the so-
called Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), which gives a 
‘rule of thumb’ to guide monetary policy-setting 
based on inflation and output.  
                                                     
1 See www.voxeu.org/article/helicopter-money-
policy-option, among others. 
2 This is true regardless of the source of the forecasts.  
3 Woodford (2001) proves that the Taylor rule is 
optimal from the standpoint of at least one class of 
optimising models. He also emphasises that the rule 
as originally formulated suffers from several defects, 
and modifications such as time dependency should be 
introduced.  
1. The Taylor rule 
In macroeconomic theory, a standard policy 
guideline for setting interest rates by central 
banks is given by the Taylor rule. In its original 
formulation, the rule implies that the central 
bank policy rate should respond to the 
equilibrium nominal interest rate, deviations of 
inflation from the target rate and the output gap:  
݅௧௜ ൌ ݎ∗ ൅ ߨ௧ ൅ 0.5ሺߨ௧ െ ߨ௧∗ሻ ൅ 0.5ݕത௧௜ 
Where ݎ∗	denotes the long-term real equilibrium 
rate, πt is current inflation, π* is the target and ݕത௧௜ 
is the output gap. A key feature of the Taylor rule 
is that although the weights of inflation and the 
output gap are identical, the central bak should 
react with a factor of 1.5 to actual inflation. A 
more than 1:1 reaction to changes in actual 
inflation is a key characteristic of most monetary 
policy rules. This assumption, based on the idea 
that the key mandate of a central bank is the 
stabilisation of price developments, has 
important implications in the judgment of 
today’s policy stance. 
In Taylor’s original contribution, the equilibrium 
real interest rate was set at 2% (close to the 
estimated potential GDP growth rate), the target 
level of inflation was also set at 2% and the 
current rate inflation was measured over the 
previous four quarters, de facto being a lagged 
rate.  
Subsequent theoretical literature has shown that 
the rule incorporates features of optimal 
monetary policy,3 and it has been widely used in 
general equilibrium models to proxy the 
behaviour of the central bank. In particular, the 
rule is consistent with the framework of a central 
bank following a ‘flexible’ inflation targeting,4 i.e. 
4 Inflation targeting is a “framework for monetary 
policy characterised by the public announcement of 
official quantitative targets (or target ranges) for the 
inflation rate over one or more time horizons, and by 
explicit acknowledgement that low, stable inflation is 
monetary policy’s primary long-run goal.” (Bernanke 
et al., 1999, p. 4). Inflation targeting is usually 
modelled by a simple policy rule that anchors inflation 
expectations and delivers a good inflation outcome. 
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with a mandate on both inflation and output 
stability, as has been the case for several central 
banks since the 1990s. In reality, none of the 
world’s major central banks, i.e. the Federal 
Reserve, the ECB or the Bank of Japan, is formally 
engaged in inflation-targeting; the Bank of 
England is the only exception. Yet, this simple 
equation, in many slightly different variants, has 
been useful in capturing actual policy-making.5 
Today it is still useful to assess whether the 
monetary policy stance is roughly right given the 
key economic variables, i.e. inflation and output.  
2. Which measure of inflation? 
After John Taylor’s seminal work, a large 
academic and policy literature flourished around 
alternative specifications of rules for interest-rate 
setting. These include modifications of the 
weights applied to output and inflation 
deviations, the use of real-time data instead of ex-
post values to account for informational limits at 
the time of the policy decision,6 alternative 
measures of macroeconomic conditions and 
inflation. In particular for the latter, the literature 
has focused on current and expected (with 
different time horizons) inflation and alternative 
indicators of price developments, e.g. the GDP 
deflator, CPI (consumer price index) and core7 
inflation.  
In the original Taylor specification, it was 
implicitly assumed that the proper measure of 
inflation is the broadest possible price index, 
namely the GDP deflator. This measures the 
difference between nominal and real GDP and, 
unlike the CPI, captures changes in prices related 
to production and income developments. 
Crucially, the GDP deflator is not affected by 
taxes and input price developments. As we show 
below, the latter aspect has become important in 
a context of volatile commodity prices. 
However, when central banks adopted inflation 
targets, whether formally or informally, the 
                                                     
5 Bernanke (2015) shows how a modified Taylor rule 
fits, almost perfectly, the Fed’s stance between 1996 
and 2007.  
6 See Orphanides (2001). 
7 For instance, the Federal Reserve usually refers to the 
PCE (personal consumption expenditures) in its 
communications about inflation developments, but in 
reference measure of inflation turned out to be 
the CPI, or some variant of it. This index covers 
households’ spending and captures changes in 
the purchasing power that can affect aggregate 
demand, and consumption in particular. For this 
reason, it is the key variable in the public’s 
perceptions of price developments and why, for 
example, the ECB adopted a reference value for 
the 2% target in terms of the HICP (harmonised 
index of consumer prices). It is more easily 
understood by the wider public than the more 
abstract concept of the GDP deflator. For this 
reason, there exists a variety of measures of 
expected inflation-based consumer prices, both 
in the form of surveys and derived from 
inflation-protected bonds (based on measures of 
the CPI, rather than the GDP deflator).8  
These two different measures of inflation (CPI 
and the GDP deflator) have a different economic 
meaning and their relevance can change over 
time. Measures of inflation based on consumer 
prices are more relevant in a context where 
developments in demand and in particular 
households’ inclination to spend and to repay 
debt are the concern of the central bank. This was 
the case during the ‘Great Moderation’ when 
public and corporate debt did not seem to be 
relevant. But this has changed. Today a key 
problem is the high levels of government and 
corporate debt (see Figure 2).  
In today’s context of high debt, the GDP deflator 
provides a better guideline for policy-making. 
Debt sustainability for governments and 
corporates depends more on the growth of their 
revenues, i.e. nominal GDP, than on consumers’ 
purchasing power measured by the CPI. 
As shown in Figure 3, the usual (public) debt 
sustainability condition as measured by the 
difference between nominal GDP growth and 
nominal interest rate is now satisfied in each of 
the regions considered and the situation of 
debtors is now better than any time over the last 
practice, core PCE is the relevant indicator for 
monetary policy-setting. 
8 In practice, one can calculate at least some measure 
of expected inflation based on the GDP deflator from 
the official forecasts for real and nominal GDP from 
major institutions, e.g. the IMF and the European 
Commission. 
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20 years. In the euro area current conditions are 
exactly the same as in 2006. 
Figure 2. Government and corporate debt as percent of 
GDP in US, Japan and the euro area (1999 and 2015) 
Data sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Bank of Japan, ECB and Ameco. 
 
As shown in Figure 3, the usual (public) debt 
sustainability condition as measured by the 
difference between nominal GDP growth and 
nominal interest rates is now positive in each of 
the regions considered and better than any time 
over the last 20 years. In the euro area, current 
conditions are exactly the same as in 2006.    
Figure 3. The (negative) snowball effect 
 
Note: Long-term interest rates on sovereign bonds as a 
measure of interest rates. 
Data sources: Ameco, ECB, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System and IMF. 
The choice between these two price indices 
seemed ‘academic’ for a long time, as the two 
indices usually display a high degree of co-
movement. This has indeed been the case in the 
US, as shown in Figure 4, which plots the US GDP 
deflator and the preferred measure of inflation of 
the Federal Reserve, namely the PCE. 
However, the two indices have had a very 
divergent development in other advanced 
economies.
Figure 4. US: GDP deflator vs. PCE (1996=100) 
 
Note: PCE is produced by the US Department of Commerce, and the Fed often refers to the 
indicator to measure price inflation. 
Data sources: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Federal Reserve of Saint Louis and IMF. 
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Figure 5. Japan: Deflator vs. CPI (1999=100) 
 
Data sources: Bank of Japan and IMF. 
Figure 6. The UK: Deflator vs. CPI (1996=100) 
 
Data source: Ameco. 
Figure 5 shows that in Japan the two variables 
exhibited very different trends over more than 15 
years. Both the CPI and the GDP deflator have 
been falling trend-wise until 2012, at least, but the 
GDP deflator has fallen by about 10% points 
more, about 0.6% more per annum. This more 
inflationary (or rather less deflationary) trend of 
the CPI has thus masked, partially, the urgency 
to fight deflation in a country that has the highest 
public debt ratio within the OECD.  
In the UK, the trend in the two variables has been 
quite similar, but until 2007, the GDP deflator 
grew faster than the CPI, creating a gap between 
the two variables of almost 10 points in 2007, after 
which it slowly reduced with the CPI growing 
more than the deflator. Over the last two years, 
CPI inflation slowed down to zero while the GDP 
deflator continued to grow (see Figure 6). Figure 
7 shows that in the euro area until 2007 the HICP 
has been moving in tandem with the GDP 
deflator. Thus, until the crisis started, it did not 
make any difference whether the ECB 
concentrated on the HICP instead of the GDP 
deflator.9 But after 2008, a large and variable gap 
has opened between the two. The reason for this 
is most probably the large swings in the prices of 
commodities (in particular oil).
Figure 7. HICP vs GDP deflator in the euro area (1996=100) 
 
Data sources: Eurostat and Ameco. 
                                                     
9 See Gros (2015). 
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As result, until about 2013, the HICP increased by 
more than the GDP deflator, but then the 
opposite happened. In 2015, the difference 
between inflation measured by the HICP and the 
GDP deflator for the eurozone was above 1 
percentage point, 0 inflation based on the HICP 
and 1.2 on the GDP deflator. If the ECB were 
looking at the GDP deflator, it would not quite 
have hit its target, but it certainly would not have 
to agonise over how to escape ‘deflation’. 
3. Implementing the original rule 
An instructive way to illustrate the importance of 
the choice of the price index for central bank 
policy-setting today is to assume that the original 
Taylor rule remains appropriate. 
A key aspect here is that the factor weight 
accorded to actual inflation is at 1.5 much higher 
than for output, 0.5.  
In 2015, the difference between the HICP and the 
GDP deflator, 1.2%, p.a., as mentioned above, 
implies that, if the ECB were to follow a Taylor 
rule based on the inflation measured by GDP 
deflator, the policy rate would be 1.8 percentage 
points higher than if using the HICP. Using the 
appropriate price index can thus be crucial. In the 
case of the output gap, given that it enters only 
with a fraction in the Taylor rule, a mis-
measurement problem would lead to a smaller 
difference in the policy rate. 
Table 1 shows the policy rates for the major 
central banks, derived from the original Taylor 
rule, assuming that the equilibrium real rate is 
zero in each year and in each country.10 This 
strong assumption implies that our estimates are 
likely to be too low for a proper Taylor rule. 
Indeed in the long run the equilibrium real rate 
should be close to potential output growth, 
which should be at least positive. Even for the 
euro area, potential output growth is around 1% 
per annum, implying that this estimate of the 
Taylor rule is about 1 full percentage point too 
low. 
                                                     
10 This assumption reflects the “secular stagnation” 
hypothesis evoked by Larry Summers (2013) in his 
speech at the IMF and in Summers (2014). A critical 
Table 1. Taylor rule-based policy rate over time 
assuming real equilibrium interest rate = 0 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
EA -0.5 -0.9 0.0 0.2 1.0 
US 0.0 0.4 -0.3 0.3 1.4 
Japan -2.5 0.6 1.1 -1.3 -0.2 
UK 1.1 1.5 0.0 0.9 2.3 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO and IMF. 
For the euro area the key message emerging from 
the table is that monetary policy might have been 
too tight until 2014. The original Taylor rule 
would have recommended negative policy rates 
until then. But the ECB was looking at HICP 
inflation, which was driven partially by oil 
prices, and even the core HICP (often advocated 
as a benchmark) did not strip out fully the impact 
of commodity prices. This explains why the ECB 
did not try more unconventional measures (like 
negative rates) during that period.  
For 2016 and for 2017, however, the rule suggests 
that rates should return positive. This is in stark 
in contrast with the current debate about what 
more can be done to ensure looser monetary 
conditions. The large swings in commodity 
prices thus induced the ‘inflation-obsessed’ ECB 
into making the wrong call twice: it should have 
been more expansionary until 2014 and, it is now 
flailing about in search of additional measures, 
when it should actually be tightening. 
For the US and the UK, the picture is not as stark 
also because for the US the difference between 
(the change in) PCE and GDP deflator is smaller, 
as shown above. But even here, it would now be 
time to tighten considerably. In Japan the time to 
move away from the zero lower bound seemed 
to have arrived as well when the Bank of Japan 
was in its early days for implementing very 
aggressive bond purchases. 
Table 1 is based on ex-post data, as available 
today. However, the last years were a period of 
considerable uncertainty, not only about 
commodity prices, but also the output gap. To be 
fair to central banks, one should use only the 
point of this assumption is that negative real interest 
rates are a necessary condition for full employment. 
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information available at the time decisions were 
made.  
Table 2 thus shows the same Taylor rule exercise 
with real time output gap and inflation 
expectations, measured by the forecasts of the 
GDP deflator.11  
Table 2. Taylor-rule with an equilibrium rate of 0%, 
inflation expectations and real-time data 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
EA -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 0.2 1.1 
US -0.7 -0.3 1.2 0.3 1.4 
Japan -2.6 0.6 0.1 -1.3 -0.2 
UK 0.3 1.2 1.2 0.9 2.4 
Note: Inflation expectations for current year. 
Source: Own elaboration based on AMECO and IMF. 
The predicted rates are now sometimes lower 
than in Table 1, but overall, with the exception of 
Japan, the rule recommends positive rates 
everywhere.  
Table 3, which compares the policy rates 
recommended by the rule with the actual policy 
rate for the current year, suggests an excess of 
expansionary monetary zeal in most developed 
countries. If one uses the GDP deflator to 
measure inflation, policy rates should be higher 
almost everywhere, even taking into account the 
fact that in two areas (Japan and the EA) the 
output gap is still negative.  
Table 3. Taylor rule versus actual policy rate, 2016 
 Taylor rule-
recommended 
policy rate  
Actual 
policy 
rate 
Output gap 
(change from 
2015) 
EA r* plus 0.2 0.0 -1.1 (+07) 
US r* plus 0.3 0.5 0.4 (+0.3) 
Japan r* plus -1.3 0.1 -0.9 (+0.6) 
UK r* plus 0.9 0.0 0.3 (+0.3)  
Note: Using the Taylor rule from Table 1. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from European 
Commission, IMF and national central banks. 
                                                     
11 We use the forecasts published in spring for the 
same year. 
4. Monetary policy and the rule in 
the euro area  
Figure 8 focuses on the euro area and  compares 
the actual policy rate with the policy rate 
predicted by the Taylor rule, using real-time data 
and ex-post data, under the assumption that the 
equilibrium real interest rate is positive and close 
to the potential GDP. (See the Figures A1 and A2 
in the Annex to assess the ECB performance 
under different assumptions about the 
equilibrium real interest rate). Leaving aside the 
difference between ex-post and real time, the rule 
suggests that monetary policy was too loose until 
2008 and then too tight in 2009 and in 2010. 
Between 2011 and 2014, the fit is quite good for 
the real-time and perfect for the ex-post 
estimates. It is since 2015 that the difference 
between the recommendation of the rule and the 
actual rate becomes evident. According to the 
rule, the ECB should have gradually started to 
tighten, instead of searching for additional 
unconventional policy tools to ease policy 
further.  
Figure 8. Original Taylor rule, ex-post and real time 
and ECB policy rate, positive equilibrium real interest 
rate  
Note: Real equilibrium interest rate chosen as 2% until 
2008, thereafter at 1%.  
Data sources: ECB, European Commission’s statistical 
annex and Ameco. 
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particular that the GDP deflator will increase at a 
rate that is much closer to the 2% target than the 
CPI. The fact that the output gap is improving 
suggests that current concerns about a deflation 
spiral are overblown.  
This is reflected in the recent IMF forecasts on 
GDP and the deflator, which predict a nominal 
average growth rate of above 4% over the next 5 
years for the UK and the US (see Table 4). The 
euro area is forecasted to achieve an average 
deflator of 1.3%, leading to nominal growth of 
just below 3%. None of these forecasts suggests a 
deflationary spiral, even for Japan. 
Table 4. IMF forecasts for average real GDP growth 
and average inflation rate, 2016-20  
 Average 
real growth 
rate 
Average 
GDP 
deflator 
Annual 
nominal 
growth rate 
EA 1.6 1.3 2.9 
US 2.5 1.9 4.4 
Japan 0.7 0.4 1.2 
UK 2.2 2.1 4.3 
Source: IMF. 
5. Concluding remarks  
Central banks in advanced economies consider 
deflation the biggest risk they are facing. The ECB 
and the Bank of Japan are considering new tools 
to provide additional stimuli and even the 
Federal Reserve has indicated that it is delaying 
its path of ‘normalisation’ of interest rates.  
The fear of deflation, however, is based solely on 
one indicator, the weak growth in consumer 
prices. Broader price indices, like the GDP 
deflator, do not signal impending deflation. On 
the contrary, the GDP deflator is increasing 
almost everywhere by about 1.2-1.5% and growth 
is almost everywhere at or above potential. 
Unemployment is at record lows in the US and 
Japan, and it is declining in the euro area. The 
overall macroeconomic situation thus does not 
                                                     
12 From any institution, from the IMF to the European 
Commission.  
give any indication of an imminent deflationary 
spiral. 
Central banks are misled by the signal coming 
from consumer prices. Consumer prices are more 
easily understood and communicated to the 
public at large, and for this reason were chosen 
as the reference point in the formulation of the 
target inflation. Nevertheless, they are influenced 
by swings in commodity prices and in certain 
circumstances do not provide a useful indicator 
of longer-term price pressures. Even core CPI 
inflation measures, which strip out the direct, but 
not the indirect impact of commodity prices, are 
of limited help.   
In the monetary policy setting, the proper choice 
of the price index becomes more important than 
it appears at first sight, because the usual rules of 
thumb imply that the central bank should react 
by more than 1:1 to any excess inflation or 
deflation.  
More importantly, the main brake on the ongoing 
recovery is widely presumed to be the debt 
overhang from the credit boom of the early 2000s. 
The proper price index to measure the degree to 
which monetary policy can facilitate 
deleveraging is the GDP deflator. Growth in 
nominal GDP is a much better indicator of the 
growth in revenues that highly indebted 
governments and corporations can expect. This is 
another reason to prefer the GDP deflator as an 
indicator for the monetary policy stance in 
today’s high-debt environment. 
Forecasts12 of the nominal GDP growth rates 
across advanced economies remain also far away 
from deflationary levels. For the EU, nominal 
GDP is forecast to grow by 3% per annum until 
2020. This forecast is not compatible with the 
perceived need for additional monetary stimulus 
and does not seem to be compatible with 
negative interest rates for a 5-year horizon.  
It is time for a normalisation of global monetary 
policy. 
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Annex  
Figure A1. EA: Taylor rule with real time data 
 
Figure A2. EA: Taylor rule with ex-post data 
 
Notes:  
Hp1: equilibrium real rate= 1 over the entire period.  
Hp2: equilibrium real rate=2 between 2000 and 2008 and thereafter=1.  
Hp3: equilibrium real rate=2 between 2000 and 2008, 1 between 2009 and 2014 and 0 in 2015 and 2016. 
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